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CHAPTER I

MORAL ORIENTATION
Every day there are countless numbers of decisions made, actions
taken, and problems wrestled with.
familiar with.

But why

situations choose to act

do some

These are aspects of life we are all
people faced

in opposite ways?

and actions pose thorny problems

with seemingly

similar

Why do certain situations

for some people but not others?

The

answers to these and similar questions lie in the different ways people
characteristically meet life and the ways in which they experience and
define their world.

Understanding these various approaches to living is

fundamental to an undestanding of human beings.
This study examines how people approach one area of social life,
the moral domain.
define.
posed,

Moral domain and morality are difficult concepts to

Many competing and widely divergent definitions have been pronone

of which

grounds (Macintyre,

can ulimately be justified on

1984).

purely

rational

In this study, no definition of morality is

put forth although certain assumptions about its nature are made.

The

term morality will be used to refer to the problem of what is right or
wrong in the conduct of an individual as it affects his or her own life
and the lives of other persons in the group.

This morality is consid-

ered to be a product of the person's reciprocal interaction with the
environment and to have both cognitive and affective components.

1

Com-

2

mitment to a moral code (the rules, principles, and values that regulate
moral conduct) is seen as depending on the use of reason and also on
attachment to other persons and to social groups.

Other researchers,

such as Vine (1983), have also conceptualized morality in this way.
In this project it is also assumed that within the limits of the
above
ality.

co~ceptualization,

people have different orientations toward mor-

That is, that they construct, resolve, and evaluate moral prob-

lems in their lives in characteristically different ways.

This means

that one person's moral conflict may not be another's and the same moral
issue may be seen in a variety of ways.

One purpose of this project is

to assess the kinds of moral orientations young adults evidence in their
descriptions of real-life moral dilemmas.
Moral orientation is only a single aspect of a person's functioning.

It does not exist in isolation and it is expected to be related to

other characteristics of the person.

The larger purpose of this study

is to investigate the relations among the moral orientations of young
adults and the person variables of ego development, sex, and individual
differences 'in motives of intimacy and power.
I will proceed by first describing the care and justice moral orientations

(MOs)

and some criticisms of the dominant model of moral

development that are relevant to this study.

In later chapters I will

discuss those factors expected to be related to moral orientation.
Carol Gilligan (1982) hypothesized the existence of two different
orientations toward morality, one centered around an ethic of care and
responsibility and the other around an ethic of justice.

These two ori-

3
entations

define

perceptions

of

morality

differently

experience,

self,

and

and

are

based

relationships

upon

different

to others.

As

a

result, the conflictual issues, mode of moral reasoning and moral conduct vary with the type of orientation.
In the care MO,

morality is defined interpersonally in terms of

responsibilities in relationships.
themselves

as

Individuals with a care MO perceive

intimately connected

to others.

Their moral

conflicts

take the form of a problem in relationships (e.g., self versus others'
needs) and center around issues of selfishness, attachment, and responsibility to others.

For them, to act morally is to respond to others in

others' terms, that is, by "considering their situations as if one were
in them oneself" (Lyons, 1983, p.

135).

People with a care orientation

take moral action in consideration of the consequences to all involved.
Their thinking is practical, contextual, and inductive.
In the justice orientation, morality is a matter of abstract principles and individual's rights.
selves

as

essentially separate

Persons with a justice MO view themfrom others.

Their conflicts

involve

exercising their own rights without interfering with the rights of others.

To

treated"

act

morally

(Lyons,

is

1983).

"to

treat

Their

others

as

moral dilemmas

you

would

consist of

like

to

be

conflicting

principles or standards and arise over issues of equality, fairness and
the protection of rights.
tive,

and

Their mode of reasoning is abstract, objec-

logically formal.

They

assume

that a

universally

"right"

answer exists.
These two orientations are not mutually exclusive.

Gilligan sug-

4
gests that women are more likely to hold a care MO and men a justice MO
possibly because

of differing

social .experiences.

However,

she

adds

that these two orientations are complementary rather then opposing and
that the developmental task for both sexes is to recognize the value of
the other perspective and integrate it into a more comprehensive morality of rights and responsibilities.
Gilligan's thesis challenges the currently dominant psychological
model
1981).

of

moral

development,

Kohlberg

development.

has

that

proposed

a

of

Lawrence

Kohl berg

cognitive-structural

According to Kohlberg,

(1968,

model

moral

moral development occurs through

the progressive transformation of basic cognitive structures.
structures

of

1976,

Cognitive

(products of the individual and his or her interaction with

the environment) are the rules, procedures, and processes that the person uses to organize and interpret experience.

As development proceeds,

these structures become increasingly differentiated, integrated and complex.

Kohlberg

has

identified

moral

reasoning stages with each stage characterized by the use of a

specific cognitive structure.
the hierarchy the

a

hierarchical,

(See Table 1.)

invariant

sequence

of

As the person moves up

cognitive structure employed becomes

more and more

adequate for making moral decisions.
Kohlberg

and

those

researchers

using

his

system

assess

moral

development with his Moral Judgment Interview or some variation of it.
This method of assessment requires the subject to respond to a hypothetical moral conflict situation by telling what the protagonist of the

Table 1
Kohlberg's Stages of Moral Reasoning

What is Right

Reasons for Doing Right

Level I - PRECONVENTIONAL
Stage 1
Punishment and obedience orientation

Stage 2
Instrumental relativist orientation

(continued)

Goodness and badness of
an action determined by
its physical consequences;
obedience for its own
sake.

Avoidance of punishment,
and the superior power of
authorities.

Right action is that which
meets one's own interests
or needs or those of others.
Right is also what's fair,
a deal, an agreement.

To serve one's own
interests while recognizing that other's have
their own interests, too.

Table 1 (continued)

What is Right

Reasons for Doing Right

Level II - CONVENTIONAL
Stage 3
Interpersonal concordance or "good
boy - nice girl" orientation

Stage 4
Law and order orientation

"Being good" is important
and means having good motives, showing concern for
others and living up to
people's expectations of
you. It also means keeping
mutual relationships such
as trust, loyalty, respect
and gratitude,

To be a good person in
your own eyes and those
of others. Belief in the
Golden Rule. Desire to
maintain and support the
social order

Doing one's duty, showing
respect for others, and
maintaining the social order
for it's own sake. Upholding the law.

To keep the institution
going as a whole, to avoid
the breakdown in the system "if everyone did it."
To satisfy one's defined
obligations.

Table 1 (continued)

What is Right

Reasons for Doing Right

Level III - POST-CONVENTIONAL OR
PRINCIPLED
Stage 5
Social-contract, legalistic,
utilitarian orientation

Stage 6
Universal ethical principles

a

Adapted from Kohlberg, 1976

Right action defined in
terms of general individual rights and in
tenns of standards which
have been agreed upon by
society. Awareness of
the relativism of most
values and rules and the
universality of others
such as life and liberty.

A sense of obligation to
law because of one's
social contract to make
and keep laws for the
welfare of all and the
protection of rights.
Emphasis on procedural
rules for reaching consensus. "The greatest good
for the greatest number."

Right is defined by the
decision of conscience in
accord with self-chosen
ethical principles that are
universal principles of
justice; the equality of
human rights.

The belief as a rational
person in the validity of
universal, abstract moral
principles and a sense
of personal commitment to
them, Recognition that
persons are ends in themselves and must be treated
as such.

8

dilemma should do and then justifying that course of action. The subject's moral reasoning is elicited in either a free-response (interview)
or standardized questionnaire mode
developmental level.

(Rest,

1975)

and then scored for

The subject is assigned a stage score (i.e., moral

maturity level) corresponding to the structure of his or her moral reasoning.
The Kohlbergian model is based on a liberal, individualist, justice-based ethic and in it a "more adequate" moral judgment refers to a
"more adequate" comprehension of what is most just or fair.

Kohlberg's

model embodies the justice orientation described by Gilligan, and she
accepts it as being applicable to one aspect of moral development and
understanding.

She also adopts, as does Kohlberg, a constructivist and

developmental approach to understanding morality.

However, she opposes

his assumption that justice lies at the core of all morality and that
the use of formal, abstract reasoning is the most important component in
moral decision-making.
Kohl berg's highly cognitive system gives little weight to irrational but morally relevant emotions such as compassion, sympathy and
love and deals primarily with prohibition-oriented dilemmas.
and others (Gilligan, 1982;

Gilligan

Haan, 1978; Kurdek, 1981) charge that with

its emphasis on formal, logical thought and the resolution of abstract,
hypothetical dilemmas, it focuses on only one type of moral understanding to the exclusion of other, different conceptions of morality.

This

may account for there being little evidence to show any consistent relation between moral structure and moral conduct (Blasi, 1980; Haan, 1978)

9

or

between

(Gilligan

moral

reasoning

in

a

hypothetical

versus

real

situation

& Belenky, 1980; Haan, 1975, 1978).

Gilligan claims that to find evidence of these differing conceptions

one

should

look

at

real-life moral problems.

people's

spontaneous

thinking

about

their

Gilligan herself did this, deriving much of

her own t_heory from a series of three studies she conducted to assess
the relations between subjects'

view of themselves

and their thinking

about morality to their experiences of moral conflict and the making of
life choices.
The subjects in these studies
semi-structured interviews

(male and female) participated in

in which they were told

to describe them-

selves and asked how they defined morality and what kinds of experiences
they interpreted as conflicts

in their

lives.

She found evidence for

two distinct approaches to morality which she subsequently called the
care and justice moral orientations.
The validity of her evidence has not gone unchallenged, however.
Broughton

(1983)

has

criticized Gilligan

for

selectively

presenting

excerpts from the interview data that support her theory while failing
to present contrary evidence contained within the interviews.

He re-an-

alyzed, in their entirety, several of the interviews that Gilligan had
presented in

support of her theory.

He concluded that there was no

strong evidence that women reasoned differently than men.
The purpose of the present study is to gain a better understanding
of the care and justice orientations and the factors related to them.
As in Gilligans' research, subjects will be asked to describe their own

10
experiences of moral
problems.

conflict rather than being

presented with moral

In this way, those elements associated with the two orienta-

tions will be given greatest freedom to appear.

A given individual's

moral

definition

orientation

influences

that

individual's

dilemmas as well as his/her moral reasoning and conduct.
character,istics of moral

conflicts are expected to

of

moral

Therefore, the

differ for people

with a care MO as opposed to those with a justice MO and it is expected
that these differences will be reflected in their descriptions of the
moral conflicts that they have experienced.
This study will also examine three factors expected to be related
to MO.

An important feature of both Gilligan's and Kohl berg's theories

is the constructivist view of human development and nature adopted in
each.
are

This view is, as noted earlier, the assumption that human beings
in

an interactive

and

reciprocal

world and they affect that world.

relationship with

the

external

It assumes that humans actively con-

struct their experience, including moral experience.

Moral orientation

refers to the ways in which a person characteristically constructs his/
her moral experience.

This study will examine

three variables

(sex,

stage of ego development, and motive) that are hypothesized to influence
peoples'
related

constructions of experience and are therefore expected to be
to

moral

orientation.

In

the

detailed presentation of these variables
ships to MO will be made.

following

sections,

a

more

and their expected relation-

CHAPTER II

SEX DIFFERENCES IN MORAL ORIENTATION

Kohlberg's theory of moral development and his scoring system have
been

criticized

Holstein, 1976).

for

being

sex-biased

(Gilligan,

1982;

Haan,

1977;

Gilligan asserts that Kohlberg's model emphasizes tra-

ditionally masculine values such as rationality,
sonality and justice,
for welfare, caring,

and places less

individuality,

imper-

importance on feminine concerns

and responsibility.

This

results

in women being

placed at lower stages than men because their traditional orientation to
empathy, and concern for and sensitivity to the needs of others is associated with Stage 3 reasoning (a less advanced stage) in Kohlberg's systern.
Gilligan theorized that men and women, as a group, have qualitatively different orientations toward morality (i.e., care vs.

justice)

because of differing perceptions of self, other and relationships.

She

states:
The moral judgments of women differ from those of men in the greater
extent to which women's judgments are tied to feelings of empathy
and compassion and are concerned with the resolution of real as
opposed to hypothetical dilemmas (1982, p. 68).
Gilligan formulated an alternative stage sequence for the development of women's moral

reasoning that revolves

around changes in self-

concept and in the understanding of the relationship between self and
11

12
other.

Movement proceeds from an initial concern with survival and the

self as the sole object of concern (Level I), to a focus on "goodness"
as self-sacrifice (Level II),

and finally,

to an adoption of non-vio-

lence and caring as a universal obligation and the most adequate guide
to the resolution of conflict in human relationships (Level III).

The

central moral problem for women is the conflict between self and other;
i.e., how to maintain connection and care for others while still valuing
oneself.

Transition between stages involves a re-interpretation of the

conflict between selfishness and responsibility.
Gilligan describes female gender identity as being defined through
attachment.

For women,

nected to others.

the self is experienced as intrinsically con-

Their very sense of being initially comes through

connection and is maintained through connection (e.g., the mother-daughter relationship).

Women perceive the world as a "web" of human rela-

tionships and within this web the primary moral problem is how to care
best for all involved, or alternatively, how to inflict the least hurt.
Women's strongest qualities are those associated with relationship such
as empathy, ·nurturance, caring,

interpersonal responsibility,

interde-

pendence,- and sensitivity and responsiveness to the needs of others.
These qualities are reflected in the ways women construct, resolve, and
evaluate moral problems.
Gilligan

proposes

that

for

men,

however,

identity

is

defined

through separation (e.g., becoming distinct from mother).

A man's most

basic experience of himself is as a separate individual.

His world is

that of a "hierarchy of conflicting rights" (Reimer, 1983) held together

13
by systems of rules.

Each person is striving to achieve his or her own

aims in an equitable and just fashion.

The fundamental moral concern is

how to apply principles of fairness

and equality to opposing claims.

Masculine strengths are those qualities associated with autonomy,

indi-

viduation, and formal systems and include mastery, assertion, rationality and ,logical thought.

These qualities

are expressed in a

justice

orientation to morality.
In summary, Gilligan postulates that males and females have different perceptions of self, others, and relationships and show strengths
in different areas of personality functioning
tery).

(e.g.,

empathy vs.

mas-

These differences are manifested in the adoption of either the

care or justice orientations to real-life moral dilemmas.
There is evidence to support Gilligan's hypotheses about masculine
and feminine functioning although not necessarily her notions of care
and justice ethics.

Carlson

(1971)

conducted a

series of studies to

assess sex differences in personality functioning.

In his first study,

Carlson asked male and female college students to do a series of tasks
designed to· assess
ence.

their representations of self,

others, and experi-

There were 37 males and 39 females in his sample.

Subjects were

required to complete an adjective checklist and Kelly's Role Construct
Repertory

Test

(self-representation);

to

write

a

brief

personality

sketch of someone they knew fairly well (representation of others); to
write

a

description

of

the

physical

environment

of

their

childhood

milieu (representation of physical space); and to describe the type of
person they expected to be in 15 years

and what they expected to be

14
doing (representation of time).

His results indicated that, in general,

males represent experiences of self, others, space and time in individualistic, objective, and distant ways while females represent the same
experiences in relatively interpersonal, subjective and immediate ways.
Males

tended to differentiate themselves

from their environment while

women experienced themselves as intrinsically connected to their milieu
and to others.
In a second study, Carlson asked male and female college students
to describe critical experiences of seven affects.
ative

affects

of

shame,

fear,

anger

and

affects of joy, excitement and surprise.

disgust,

These were the negand

the

positive

He found that a larger propor-

tion of males than females described incidents involving such themes as
achievement,
quest.

separateness,

aggression and

sexuality as

drive or

con-

A greater proportion of females reported experiences of social

acceptance, togetherness, receptivity, dependence, altruism, and sexuality as belonging.
Carlson did not attribute these differences in personality functioning to sex, per se, as there was considerable overlap between
and females in the studies he conducted.

males

Rather, he explained them in

terms of Bakan's formulation of agency and communion (1966) which accomodates sex differences as well as overlap.

Bakan's theory and its rel-

evance to moral orientation will be discussed more fully in the later
section on power and intimacy motives.
More

recently,

Lyons

(1983)

derived from Gilligan's theory.

directly

tested

several

hypotheses

She studied a group of 36 people con-

15
sisting of 2 males and 2 females at each of the following ages: 8, 11,
14-15, 19-22, 27, 36, 45, and 60 or more years.

The subjects were given

a semi-structured interview designed to assess how individuals construct
their experiences of self and the moral domain.

The data were analyzed

for modes of self-definition (separate or connected), moral orientation
within considerations of real-life moral dilemmas (care or justice), and
correlations between mode of self-definition and moral orientation.

In

general, her results supported the hypotheses that there are two different orientations toward morality (care and justice) and that these orientations are not mutually exclusive al though individuals usually use
one mode predominantly.
Lyons

also

investigated sex differences

in self-definition and

understandings of relationships and their relation to moral orientation.
She found that women more frequently characterized themselves and their
relationships to others in terms of connection while men more frequently
did this in terms of a separate/objective self.

As regards moral orien-

tation, Lyons found that females more frequently evidenced a care ethic
and men a justice ethic.
characterizing themselves

However, regardless of sex, those individuals
predominantly in connected terms

most

fre-

quently used a care and responsibility orientation while those individuals characterizing themselves in separate/objective terms used a rights
and justice orientation.

Her results also suggested that there are dis-

tinctive kinds of developmental shifts for men and women in the frequency of their use of the two orientations, with women after age 27
showing increased consideration of rights in their conceptualizations of

16
morality,

and

adolescent

males

a greater

showing

response than males at other ages.

consideration

of

She concluded that the relationship

between sex and MO i~ not a simple one and that ''in real-life moral conflict,

individuals ... call upon

and think about both

care and justice

considerations but use predominantly one mode which is

related to but

not defined or confined to an individual by virtue of gender" (p. 138).
Numerous studies have examined sex differences in specific qualities

that

logically may be associatd with either the care or justice

orientations to morality.

However, research in the area of sex differ-

ences is fraught with problems (Deaux, 1984; Jacklin, 1981) and the literature is often conflicting and difficult to interpret.
remembered, also,
structs that

It must be

that even when studies show sex differences in con-

are related to Gilligan's

theory,

these studies are not

direct tests of her theory and therefore provide only indirect support
for her claim that there are differences
women.

With that said,

conclusions

a

in the morality of men and

presentation and discussion of some of the

regarding male and female functioning in areas related to

morality (a.g., affiliation, nurturance, helping behavior, and empathy)
is made in the following paragraphs.
In support of Gilligan's hypotheses, reviewers have found females
to

be

(Tavris

more

affiliative

& Offer,

than

males

in

both

1977), and behavior (Hoyenga

self-report

& Hoyenga,

and

fantasy

1979).

Females

also tend to concentrate their social life in a few close attachments
while males'

social

relationships (Seward

life

tends

& Seward,

to

be diffused

1984).

over many

superficial

In addition, females in compari-

17
son to males have been found to be more nurturant,

(Seward & Seward,

1984), more likely to use nurturant behaviors when helping people with
problems

(Hoyenga & Hoyenga,

1979), more sensitive to social stimuli

(Hayenga & Hoyenga, 1979), and more empathic (Hoffman, 1977).
In contrast, other reviewers have concluded that there are no consistent sex differences in affiliation (Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974), nurturance (Deux, 1984;

Hayenga & Hayenga, 1979), prosocial orientation and

altruistic behavior (Mussen & Eisenberg-Berg, 1977), or empathy (Maccoby

& Jacklin, 1974).
These opposing conclusions illustrate the impossibility of coming
to any definitive conclusions regarding sex differences given the present state of our knowledge in this area.

Nevertheless, as methods and

constructs become more refined, sex differences are sometimes revealed
in areas where earlier they had not been thought to exist.

The opposing

conclusions of Hoffman and Maccoby and Jacklin regarding empathy is a
case in point.

As noted, Maccoby and Jacklin found no differences in

empathy between males and females.

Hoffman, however, came to a differ-

ent conclusion when employing a more specific definition of empathy than
that used by Maccoby and Jacklin.

He defined it as

"the observer's

vicarious affective response to another person" and differentiated it
from cognitive perspective-taking skills (Maccoby and Jacklin did not).
After analyzing those studies reviewed by Maccoby and Jacklin as well as
more recent research, Hoffman concluded that females were more empathic
than males throughout the life cycle, but that there were no differences
in their respective abilities to recognize others' affective or cogni-

18
tive states (i.e., perspective).
Hoffman's findings are of special
explain some
(1983).

of the

differences

in

interest because they may help

moral orientation

found by

Lyons

Her results indicated that individuals with a justice orienta-

tion respond to others as
were in t?e other's place.

they would

like to be responded to if they

Those with a care orientation, on the other

hand, respond to the other as the other would like to be responded to.
This seems to imply the ability to imagine oneself as the other (and not
simply oneself in the other's place) which may be related to a greater
capacity to feel as
then,

the other feels.

These two modes of responding,

may reflect the difference between a

the other's perspective

versus

cognitive understanding of

an empathic experiencing of the other

person's situation.
The evidence thus far seems to support the hypothesis that differences

in

personality functioning

are associated

with different

moral

orientations, but is equivocal in regard to sex differences in specific
traits or behaviors thought to be related to MO.

There is some evidence

for sex differences in moral orientation but this finding has not been
replicated.
Gilligan also made the assertion, noted previously,

that women's

greater use of the care ethic results in their being scored at a lower
stage of moral development

in Kohl berg's system than are males.

This

claim has not been supported by a recent comprehensive review of investigations

utilizing

Kohl berg's

method

of

assessment

(Walker,

1984).

Walker analyzed 108 studies and found that only 8 of these significantly
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favored males.

Of these, several were methodologically flawed

sex and occupation/education were confounded)

(e.g.,

and most relied on early

stage definitions and scoring procedures that have since been revised.
As Walker points out, however, this does not necessarily mean that sex
differences in moral reasoning do not

~xist.

There are several possible

explanatipns for a finding of no sex differences in moral
assessed by Kohlberg's measure.

judgment as

For instance, the differences may exist

in content within a stage (i.e., what the individual is valuing,

judg-

ing, or appealing to; particular norms) or in the usage of a characteristic orientation when making a moral judgment (Kohlberg, 1982).
A study

by Gibbs,

Arnold and

these alternative explanations.
level but

they did find a

Burkhart

(1984)

lends

support

to

They found no sex differences in stage

difference

in the kinds

of justifications

(modes of content usage) males and females use in support of their decisions.

The subjects (60 males and 118 females comparable in age, educa-

tion, and socioeconomic level) were given a paper and pencil measure of
reflective moral thought that provided stage and content information.
The

experimenters

discovered

that

a

significantly

greater

number

of

females than males used empathic role taking as a reason for their moral
judgment.
science

In addition, females at this stage made a greater use of conappeals

(self-approval

or

-disapproval).

The

researchers

hypothesized that these differences in content usage may be a reflection
of a greater female orientation to empathy or caring.
Another explanation for the finding of no sex differences in moral
judgment stage might be that sex differences

in preference for one or
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the other orientation do exist, but that there are no differences in
males' and females' abilities to utilize either orientation.

That is,

both sexes may be able to use the care and justice MOs equally well
while preferring (given the choice) to use one over the other.

If so,

it is unlikely that such a difference would be revealed in moral reasoning appli,ed to hypothetical,

abstract,

justice-

and rights-

dilemmas that "pull" for the use of a justice ethic.

oriented

This study will

attempt to avoid "pulling" for a specific orientation by asking subjects
to describe their own experiences of moral conflict and then using these
real-life dilemmas to test the hypotheses that females more frequently
use a care than a justice MO and males more frequently use a justice
than a care MO.

CHAPTER III

EGO DEVELOPMENT AND POWER AND INTIMACY MOTIVES
Loevinger's Model of Ego Development
Loevinger (1976) defines the ego as "the process that provides the
frame of reference that structures one's world and within which one perceives the world" (pp. 9-10).

Her conception of the ego emphasizes the

individual's integrative processes and the overall "framework of meaning" (Hauser, 1976) the individual imposes on experience.

Ego develop-

ment occurs through the progressive transformation of these frames of
reference, with each succeeding frame or structure being represented by
a stage further along the developmental continuum.
sequence must

Each step in the

be completed before going on to the next although people

proceed at different rates and all may not reach the later stages.
Each ego stage is associated with a specific pattern of reasoning
and bohavior and thus the developmental continuum provides a measure of
individual differences.

A person at a given stage exhibits a character-

istic orientation to self and world and develops a certain "character
style."
Ego development proceeds in the direction of a more integrated,
complex, differentiated and comprehensive perception "of one's self, of
the social world, and of the relation of one's feelings and thoughts to
those of others" (Candee,

1974).

Development occurs along the dimen21
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sions

of

impulse

control

(moral

style),

conscious

concerns,

and

interpersonal and cognitive styles, and these dimensions differ for each
The

stage.

seven stages

and three

transitional

levels

development

and

are shown

in

Table 2.
Loevinger' s

theory

of

ego

Kohl berg's

and

Gilligan's theories of moral development all share an emphasis on frameworks of meaning (i.e., the constructivist approach) and an assumption
of sequential, hierarchical stages of development.

Each stage is more

complex than the last and involves a transformation in structure.
There seems to be a similar developmental trend in all three models.

The

the self:

lower stages are marked by egocentricity and a
with survival,

concern with

one's own needs, reward and punishment.

The

next step involves an inclusion of the expectations anrl needs of others.
This is expressed in the desire for external validation and approval and
in adherance to group norms.

At the higher and more abstract levels,

there is equal valuing of self and other; recognition and toleration of
internal conflict;

and

adherance to

internal norms

and standards not

necessarily tied to conventional criteria or judgments.
Loevinger considers moral development to be part of ego development.

In his review of the literature, Hauser (1976) reported a moder-

ate though inconsistent correlation between ego stages and Kohlberg' s
moral development stages.

More recently, Lutwak's (1984)

results also

support the conclusion that these two systems are related although each
addresses

reasonably separate areas of development.

As Lutwak points

out, ego development theory seems to have a broader focus than

Table 2
Stages of Ego Developmenta

Stage
Presocial (I-1)
Symbiotic (I-1)
Impulsive (I-2)

Impulse control,
"moral" style

Interpersonal
style

Conscious
preoccupations

Impulsive, fear

Autistic
Symbiotic
Receiving,
dependent,
exploitive

Self v. non self
Self v. non self
Bodily feelings,
especially
sexual and aggressive

Cognitive
style

Stereotypy, conceptual confusion

Self-protective
(Delta)

Fear of being
caught, externalizing blame, opportunistic

Wary, manipulative, exploitive

Self-protection,
wishes, things,
advantages,
control

Transition from
self-protective
to conformist
(Delta/3)

Obedience and conf ormity to social
norms; simple and
absolute rules

Manipulative,
obedient

Concrete aspects
Conceptual s imof traditional
plicit y'
stereotypes
sex roles physical causation as
opposed to psychological causation

Conformist (I-3)

Conformity to external rules, shame,
guilt for breaking
rules

Belonging, helping, superficial niceness

Appearance, social
acceptability,
banal feelings,
behavior

(continued)

Conceptual simplicity,
stereotypes,
cliches
N

w

Table 2 (continued)

Stage

Impulse control,
"moral" style

Interpersonal
style

Transition from
conformist to
conscientious;
self-consciouness (I-3/4)

Dawning realization of standards, contingencies, selfcriticism

Being helpful,
Consciousness of
deepened inthe self as
terest in interseparate from
personal relathe group, recognition of
tions
psychological
causation

Awareness of individual differences in
attitudes,
interests and
abilities,
mentioned in
global and
broad terms

Conscientious
(I-4)

Self-evaluated
standards, self
criticism

Intensive, respon- Differentiated feelsible, mutual,
ings, motives for
concen1 for
behavior, selfconununication
respect, achievements, traits, expression

Conceptual complexity, idea
of patterning

Transition from
conscientious
to autonomous

Individuality, coping with inner
conflict

Cherishing of interpersonal relations

Communicating, expressing ideas and
feelings, process
and change

Toleration for
paradox and
contradiction

(continued)

Conscious
preoccupations

Cognitive
style

N
-~

Table 2 (continued)

Stage
Autonomous
(I-5)

Integrated
(I-6)

Impulse control,
"moral"·style

Interpersonal
style

Conscious
preoccupations

Cognitive
style

Add: Coping with
conflictingb
inner needs

Add: Respect for
autonomy

Vividly conveyed
feeling; integration of physiological and
psychological
causation of
behavior; development; role conception, self-fulfillment, self in
social context

Increased conceptual complexity; complex patterns,
toleration for
ambiguity,
broad scope,
objectivity

Add: Reconciling
inner conflicts,
renunciation of
unat tginable
goals

Add: Cherishing
Add: Identity
of individuality

aFrom Loevinger and Wessler, 1970; Hoppe, 1972.
b"Add" means in addition to the description applying to the previous level.

N
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Kohlberg's model.

It is concerned with global aspects of the self and

both emotional and cognitive experience.
facet of development, moral

Kohlberg focuses on a single

reasoning, and his model

is almost exclu-

sively cognitive in orientation.
The
has,

relationship

to t,his

between

ego development

and

moral

orientation

researcher's knowledge, not yet been investigated.

How-

ever, given that the care and justice orientations are tied to different
experiences of self and other it is reasonable to expect that moral orientation will be related to the changes
that occur during ego development.

in self and other perception

The conflict between independence

and dependence, between the self as separate and the self as connected,
is a basic theme in ego development.

Resolution, or at

least tolera-

tion, of the conflict occurs only at the highest levels.

At the lower

ego stages the self appears to be experienced primarily as either separate or as connected but not both.
simplicity operating at these stages.

This may be due to the conceptual
At higher stages, however, these

two polarities become progressively more integrated so that by Stage I-5
an individua'l recognizes both the need for "and also the limitations to
autonomy,

that

emotional

interdependence

is

inevitable"

(Loevinger,

1976, p. 23).
I described earlier how individuality and separateness

are inte-

gral to the justice MO and connection and relationship are central to
the care orientation.

Further, these two orientations appear complemen-

tary and the integration of the two is a major developmental task.

This

leads to several hypotheses about the relationship between ego stage and
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moral

orientation.

First,

it

is

expected

that

individuals

at

lower

stages of ego development (below I-4) will show primarily a justice or a
care orientation in their descriptions of moral problems.

Second, it is

hypothesized that individuals at higher ego stages (I-4 and above) will
show both the care and justice moral orientations in their descriptions
of real-life moral dilemmas.

Power and Intimacy Motives
Motives are directing and energizing forces driving individuals to
action

and

influencing which

salient to them.
of the person.
recurrent

aspects

of

their

environment

are

most

Motives point to a tendency or disposition on the part
Individuals with a high degree of a given motive show a

preference

"within the context

for

certain

of constraints

kinds

of

behavior

and opportunities

and

experiences

afforded by the

environment" (McAdams, 1985).
People are impelled by a variety of motives.
focus

upon

in

this

study

are

motives

of

The two that I will

intimacy

and power.

The

strength of .these motives is customarily assessed by means of the Thematic Apperception Test.
Intimacy motive guides the person towards communion and the merging of self, other, and environment.

It is expressed interpersonally in

closeness, openness, sharing, and cooperation.
desire

for

contact

research shows

that

and

communication

individuals

high in

with

It is manifested in the
another.

this motive

For
spend a

example,
greater

amount of time thinking about and communicating with people than those
low in this motive (McAdams

& Constantian,

1983), more frequently engage
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in

dyadic

as

opposed

to

large

group

interactions

(McAdams,

Healy &

Krause, 1984), and place a great value on trust in friendships (McAdams,
1984).
Power motive prompts
other and context.

people toward the separation

of self from

It is manifested in a preference for feeling strong

and for m4stering and having an impact on one's environment.
tions show that
group

rather

it is associated with a

than

dyadic

interact ions,

tendency to engage in largeand with

the

active, assertive or controlling role in friendships
Krause,

1984).

Investiga-

adoption

of

(McAdams, Healy

an

&

For men, but not for women, high power motive has been

found to correlate with aggressiveness, impulsivity and difficulties in
love relationships (Stewart
Intimacy and

& Rubin,

power motives

1976; Winter, 1973).

are conceptually

related to

(1966) formulation of agency and communion (McAdams, 1985).

Bakan' s

Bakan held

that these two dialectical forces comprise the basic polarity underlying
all human existence.
of

life.

He regarded them as the two fundamental modalities

Human beings exist both as

individuals via the modality of

agency, and ·as individuals participating in and belonging to a

larger

group via communion.
According to Bakan, agency is the modality of separation.

It man-

ifests itself in self-protection, self-assertion, self-expansion and the
urge to master.

Psychologically, it is experienced in the differentia-

tion of self from field and in intellectual functions involving separating and

ordering.

Agentic

interpersonal styles

are characterised by

objectivity, competiiiveness, exclusion and distance.
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Communion is the modality of non-separation.
openness, and union with others.

It involves contact,

Psychologically it is experienced as a

merging of self and field and as the sense of being at one with others.
Communion is evidenced in those intellectual functions that are communicative in nature such as verbal and language skills.
ence is
tive,

f~lt

Communions's pres-

in those styles of relating that are subjective, coopera-

acc~pting

and close.

Bakan's theory, and also the intimacy and power constructs if they
are accepted as rough indices of communion and agency, was given impressive

support

by

the

series

of

studies

conducted

by Carlson

These studies were described in Chapter 2 of this paper.

(1971).

Carlson, as

may be recalled, found that distinct patterns of agency and communion
were evidenced in subjects' perceptions of themselves, others, and their
world.

His results also indicated that communion was more characteris-

tic of females as a group and agency was more characteristic of males as
There was

considerable overlap between

the sexes,

indicating that the

relationship between sex and

modality

a group.

communion) was
motive, there

not necessarily

true

for

a given

however,

(agency or

individual.

As

for

is no consistent evidence for sex differences in either

the strength or frequency of power (Stewart
macy motives (McAdams, 1984).

&

Chester, 1982) and inti-
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Motives and Moral Orientation
Intimacy motive and the care MO emphasize many of the same qualities

i.e.,

those of communion.

emphasize agentic qualities.

Power motive and the justice MO both

This might reasonably lead one to expect a

relationship between MO and motive in the form of care being related to
intimacy and justice being related to power motive.
tion remains as to the nature of this connection.

However, the quesIn other words, what

is fundamentally common to both motive and MO that results
emphases in each?

in similar

The hypothesis adopted here is that motive and MO are

connected by way of the central roles perception of self and other play
in each.

Both motive and MO revolve around particular conceptualize-

tions and experiences of self, other, and self-other relationships.

At

the heart of power motive and the justice orientation lies the experience

of

self

as

individual

and

separate

from

others.

For

intimacy

motive and the care orientation, the basic experience of self is as connected and in union with others.

Thus, I am assuming that the relation-

ship between motive and moral orientation is mediated by particular perceptions of ·self and world.
This

study will

orientation.

First,

test two hypotheses
it

regarding motive and moral

is hypothesized that

correlated with a care orientation to morality.

intimacy motive will be
Second,

it is expected

that power motive will be correlated with a justice orientation towards
morality.
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Morality, Motive, Ego Development, and Sex
There are no published studies investigating the relations among
moral orientation,

motive,

ego

development,

and

sex.

McAdams

(1985)

did, however, assess the relationships of moral orientation as expressed
in students' religious ideologies to sex and motive.
undergrad~ate

McAdams asked 56

students (26 male and 30 female) to complete a series of

questionn{lires regarding their religious beliefs and religious experiences.

These

questions
the

TAT

questionnaires

included open-ended

and rating-type items.
and

devised a

Loevinger's

scoring

and

multiple

choice

The students were also administered

sentence

completion

system to assess

content

test

(WUSCT).

McAdams

themes of responsibility,

compassion, and care (i.e., a care orientation), and themes of rights,
laws and principles (i.e., a
ses.

Such

responses.
more

likely

themes were

justice orientation) in subjects' respon-

found to

be present

in 45~~

of the

students'

In regards to sex differences, McAdams found that women were
to emphasize

responses than ·men

(43~~

tistical significance.

to

themes of
19~~.

care and

respectively).

responsibility in

their

This result neared sta-

There were no differences in men's and women's

emphases on content themes of rights, laws, and principles in their personal religious ideologies.

In addition, McAdams found no correlation

between scores of intimacy and power motivation and moral orientation as
expressed in religious ideologies.
Block (1973) also did a study pertinent to the present investigation.

She assessed the relations of agency and communion to sex role,

moral development and ego development.

Block asked male and female uni-
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versity

students

from 6

different

countries

(including the

describe their ideal self by using an Adjective Q-Sort.

U.S.)

to

She found that

women more frequently chose adjectives reflecting qualities of communion
(e.g.,

interdependence,

mutuality,

and

relatedness)

while

men

chose

those reflecting agentic qualities (e.g., self-assertion and self-extenB~ock

sion).

also predicted that personal maturity would be associated

with a greater integration of agency and communion within the personality

and

this

would

be

reflected

in

individuals'

self-descriptions.

Using Loevinger's SCT method as an index of maturity she discovered that
for a

sample of 144 male and

141 female high school students,

those

scoring at the Conscientious level (the highest in the sample) did give
self-descriptions combining both agency and communion.
If one accepts that communal qualities are emphasized in the care
MO and agentic qualities in the justice MO, then together these findings
offer some support for the hypotheses

that males will more frequently

have a justice MO and females a care MO and that the two orientations
will be integrated by individuals at higher levels of maturity regardless of their sex.
Block
associated

also
with

found that
higher

integration

stages

of

Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview.

moral

of

agency and

development

communion

as

measured

was
by

The problem of sex bias in this

sample makes interpretation of this finding difficult,

however.

There

were 71 males but only 47 females scored at the Principled level (stages
5 and 6) compared to 105 females and 57 males scored at stage 3.

More-

over, the self-descriptions of females at the Principled level suggested
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only a tendency towards agency.
The present
method.
that have

study differs

from Block's

both in purpose and

in

The overall purpose of this study is to test the hypotheses
been made

regarding the

maturity and motive to MO.

separate relations

of gender,

ego

CHAPTER IV

METHOD
Subjects
The subjects

were 129

students enrolled

in any

one of

introductory psychology courses at a midwestern college.
males and 62 females in the sample.
ethnically

and

culturally diverse

several

There were 67

The student body at this college is
but

with

the majority of

being white and from the middle class socioeconomic level.

students

All of the

subjects took the ego development and moral orientation measures.
but

30

students

motives.

were

assessed

for

strength

of

intimacy

and

All
power

However, due to missing data, the intimacy and power motiva-

tion scores used in the data analysis were from separate groups of students.

This left a sample of 53 students for whom there were intimacy

motivation

scores

and

35

students

for

whom

there

were

power motive

scores. Thirty-two subjects were omitted from the sample for the final
data analysis because either their protocols had been used to derive the

MOQ scoring system or they had not complied with instructions when completing the

MOQ.
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Measures
Sentence Completion Test.
subjects'

stage

of ego

(SGT)._

development

The SGT was devised to assess

(Loevinger,

1976).

form of the SGT was used in this study (Holt, 1980).
sentence sterns which the subject completes.
sentence

s~erns

Subjects'

The

shortened

It consists of 12
responses to the

are individually scored as being at one of the nine lev-

els of ego development in Loevinger's system.

These individual scores

are then used to determine the subject's core level of ego functioning.
This

final

score

is

considered

to

be

the

subject's

ego

development

level.

Thematic Apperception Test.

(TAT).

The TAT was first designed by

Henry Murray (1943) as a projective measure of personality characteristics.

Subsequent modifications have allowed it to be used as a measure

of intimacy and power motivation.

In the standard group administration,

subjects write stories in response to each of six pictures.

In order of

administration the pictures are (a) two figures sitting on a bench next
to a river, '(b) a man sitting at a desk on which is a picture of a family, (c) a male ship captain talking to another man, (d) two female scientists in a laboratory,

(e) a man and woman on a trapeze, and (f) an

older man and a younger woman walking through a field with horses and a
dog.

Pictures (a) and (b) can be found in McClelland and Steele (1972)

and pictures (c),

(d)

and (e)

can be found

in McClelland (1975).

In

this study, the same set of pictures was given to both sexes in accordance with McAdams's

(1982a) argument that valuable results concerning
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intimacy and power motivation can be obtained this way provided that the
pictures do not
feminine.

represent scenes that. are stereoypically masculine or

Further, Stewart and Chester

sex of the stimulus figures in TAT

(1982) have concluded that the

pictures is usually not a signifi-

cant determinant of variance in motive scores between the sexes.

Mor~l

Orientation

instrument was
construct.

The

Questionnaire.

devised for
instrument

A paper

(MOQ).

and

pencil

this study to assess the moral orientation
requires

subjects

to

describe

dilemmas that they had personal experience or knowledge of.

four

moral

In their

descriptions, subjects are asked to incorporate the answers to each of
ten questions.
flicts

proposed

These questions focus on those dimensions of moral conto be

connected

to

the moral

orientation

construct.

These include affective, behavioral, cognitive and relational aspects of
the conflicts (See Appendix A).
Six scoring categories were developed on the basis of theoretical
speculations about the care and justice ethics and an examination of 15
protocols

(60 dilemmas) randomly selected from the entire sample. Each

category, or scale, was devised to focus on a particular aspect of the
care or justice orientation.

A complete description of the scoring sys-

tem can be found in Appendix B.
Table 3.

The names of the scales are listed in

Briefly, scale Relational Dilemma (RD) assesses whether there

is a person involved in the dilemma who has a significant relationship
with the

subject or

to whom

desire to take care of.

the subject

expresses concern

for or

a

Score Principled Dilemma (PD) assesses the sub-

37
jects use of rules,
dilemma.

norms,

and standards to describe the

These two scales address the way in which the subject con-

structs the dilemma.
of considerations
action.

principles,

The next four scoring categories assess the kinds

the subject uses

to

arrive at a moral

decision or

Consequences to Self (CS) refers to the subject's decision to

act so as to avoid some negative consequence or achieve some positive
consequence.

Concern for Others (CO) refers to both general expressions

of care and concern for another's well-being and concern about specific
consequences to the other.

Maintenance of Relationship (MR) refers to

the subject's desire to keep, strengthen, or minimize the conflict in a
relationship.

Empathy

(E)

refers

to a

cognitive understanding

affective experiencing of another's situation.

and/or

These were not the only

kinds of considerations subjects cited as reasons for their moral behavior.

However, these were chosen as a

focus in this

study because of

their expected connection to the care and justice MOs and their ability
to be scored.

Every dilemma was scored on each scale with 1

and 0 = absence.
every

indiv.idual

scores).

= presence

These scores were then summed on each scale so that
had

six

final

scores

(RD,

PD,

CS,

CO,

MR,

These separate scores were used in the data analysis.

and E
High

scores on RD, and use of the CO, MR, and E categories were considered to
indicate use of the care MO.
a justice orientation.
score.

High PD was considered to be indicative of

No specific hypotheses were made about the CS
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Table 3
MOQ Scales

RD

Relational Dilemma

PD

Principled Dilemma

cs

Consequences to self

co

Concern for others

MR

Maintenance of relationship

E

Empathy

39
Procedure
The SCT and MOQ were both administered in the course of a single
session to groups of 5 to 15 students at a time.

All subjects were ini-

tially given a statement of informed consent to read and sign.

If,

after this, they agreed to participate in the study, they were given the
SCT

follo~ed

by the MOQ.

Subjects were directed to follow the instruc-

tions printed on each measure.
same for all subjects.

The order of presentation remained the

The TAT was group administered as part of a sep-

arate research project.
The SCT was scored in the standard manner by an individual trained
in the scoring procedure.

TAT stories were scored for power and inti-

macy motivation according to the systems devised by Winter (1973)
power and McAdams (1980) for intimacy.

for

The TAT coders' agreement with

expert scoring of practice stories in the scoring manuals met acceptable
standards for research.
The MOQ was scored by three individuals, two female and one male,
according to the instructions reprinted in Appendix B.

Interrater reli-

abilities ranged from .94 for the RD category to .68 for PD to the .40's
for the moral consideration categories.

Because of the low base rate of

occurrence for these latter categories, interrater reliability was also
computed

in terms of percentage of agreement.

Results

showed that

interrater agreement for the CS category was 75% and in the 80% to 95%
range for the remaining categories.

CHAPTER V

RESULTS
The numbers
ego developmental

and percentages of males

and females

level are presented in Table 4.

scored at each

For the purpose of

data analysis subjects were divided into High ego (I-4 and above) and
Low ego (below I-4) groups.

A Chi-square analysis was used to evaluate

any differences in the numbers of males and females in the high versus
low groups.

Results indicated that there were a significantly greater

number of females

at higher ego stages and males at lower ego stages,

chi-square(l) = 11.38,

E <.01.

Descriptive statistics for males and females on intimacy and power
motivation are presented in Table 5.

The !-tests revealed no signifi-

cant

males

differences

in mean

scores

for

and

females

on

intimacy,

!(51) = -1.05, ns, or power motive, !(33) = .43, ns.

Sex Differences
The first hypothesis proposed that in their descriptions of reallife moral conflicts females would more frequently use a care MO than
would

males

females.

and

males

would

more

frequently

use

a

justice MO

than

While testing this hypothesis it was decided also to assess
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Table 4
Frequencies of Males and Females at Each Ego Stage

Females
(N = 46)

Males
(N = 51)

Total
F

Ego Stage·

F

Delta

1

1%

0

0%

1

1%

Delta/3

6

12%

1

2%

7

7%

I-3

12

24%

2

4%

14

14%

I-3/4

14

28%

11

24%

25

26%.

I-4

6

12%

22

48%

28

29%

I-4/5

8

16%

4

9%

12

12%

I-5

4

8%

6

13%

10

10%

%

F

%

%

Table 5
Comparison of Males and Females on Intimacy and Power Motivation

Males
(N = 51)
n

M

SD

Intimacy

2.4

4.04

3.14

Power

22

4.63

3.65

Females
(! = 56)
n

M

SD

Range

0-12

29

5.00

3.45

0-13

-1.05, ns

0-10

13

4.08

3. 75

0-11

0.43, ns

Range

t
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any effects for ego development stage and for an ego by sex interaction.
Because of the

intercorrelated nature. of the scores on the dependent

measure, a two-way multivariate analysis of variance was performed with
sex and ego stage as the independent classifying variables.

A regres-

sion approach was used to correct for the unequal frequencies of males
and females at higher versus lower ego stages.
iate

F tests revealed a main effect for sex across

£(1,93)
no

Results of the multivar-

= 2.413,

£ <.05,

scoring categories,

= 1.15,

but no effect for ego, £(1,93)

interaction £(1,93) = .67, ns.

ns, and

Univariate tests were performed and

indicated a significant difference for sex on the PD scale,

£(1,93)

=

on the CO scale, £(1,93) =

8.87, £ <.01,

and a nonsignificant trend

2.86, £ <.09.

The means, standard deviations, and ranges for males and

females, together with the

~esults

of the univariate tests are presented

in Table 6.
To understand the nature of these differences, the group means for
males and females in the PD and CO categories, taken
compared using !-tests.
to

expectations,

The results are presented in Table 7.

females made

greater

rules, and norms when constructing moral

£ <.01.

use

than males

dilemmas, !(95)

of

=

Contrary

principles,
-3.13,

Results also revealed that the trend for a sex difference in CO

suggested by the univariate analysis favored females,

£ <.05.

separately, were

As

hypothesized,

females more frequently

others as a reason for moral action than did males.

!(95)

=

-1.72,

cited concern for

Table 6
Comparison of Males and Females bn MOQ Scales

Males
(!! = 51)
M

Females
(!! = 46)

SD

Range

M

SD

Range

F

Relational Dilennna (RD)

2.02

.09

0-4

2.26

1.02

0-4

1.26

Principled Dilennna (PD)

1.59

1.20

0-4

2.39

1. 33

0-4

9.6*

Consequences to self (CS)

2.59

1.13

0-4

2.47

1.07

0-4

.24

Concern for Others (CO)

.88

• 84

0-3

1.20

.96

0-4

2. 89**

Maintenance of
Relationship (MR)

.43

• 78

0-3

.52

.69

0-2

• 36

Empathy (E)

.08

.27

0-1

• 07

.25

0-1

.06

*E..

<

.05

**E..

<

.09
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Table 7
Comparison of Males and Females on Principled Dilennna (PD) and Concern
for Others (CO) Scales

Males
(B_ = 51)

Females
(B_ = 46)

M

SD

M

SD

t

Principled Dilemma (PD)

1.58

1.20

2.39

1.33

-3.13

.001

Concern for Others (CO)

.88

,84

1.20

• 96

-1. 72

.OS
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Ego Development
There were two hypotheses made about the relationship between ego
development and moral orientation.

First, it was proposed that individ-

uals at lower stages of ego development (below I-4) would primarily show
either a

justice or a

dilemmas. , Secondly,

care orientation in their descriptions of moral

it was

proposed that people at higher ego stages

(I-4 and above) would show aspects of both the care and justice MOs in
their descriptions of real-life moral conflicts.
For the purpose of data analysis the CO and PD scales were chosen
as the best single representatives of the care and justice MOs, respectively.
of

the

They were chosen on the basis of theory and a factor analysis
MOQ

scales.

The

factor

analysis,

revealed the presence of three factors.

with

a

varimax

rotation,

Factor 1 had its highest load-

ings on CO (.79) and RD (.49), Factor 2 on MR (.86) and RD (.50), and
Factor 3 on E (.81) and PD (.70).

Factors 1 and 2 seemed most closely

associated with the care orientation and therefore CO was chosen to represent this MO.
tice ethic,

as

Factor 3

seemed most closely associated with the jus-

the empathy scale included

taking congruent with a justice MO.

the cognitive perspective-

However, the PD scale rather than

the E scale was chosen to represent the justice ethic because of the low
frequency of E responses.
Using the CO and PD scales to represent the care and justice MOs
respectively, subjects were divided into three groups on the basis of
their scores in both categories. Subjects who scored above the mean on
CO and PD were classified

as Both (g

= 16),

those who scored above the
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mean on either CO or PD were classified as One
did not score above the mean
ther (g

= 42).

(g

= 39),

and those who

on either category were classified as Nei-

Due to some overlap between the PD and CO scales (i.e.,

CO included concern for other's rights) the number of CO responses that
evidenced concern for other's rights was
were

not ,included in

the

subsequent

assessed and these responses

analysis.

Elimination

of

these

responses did not necessitate any regrouping of the subjects into different

MO usage groups.
A Chi-square analysis was performed to evaluate the proposed dif-

ferences in MO usage.
in Table 8.

The observed and expected frequencies are shown

The results of the analysis indicated a significant associ-

ation between ego development and MO use,

chi-square(2)

= 8.70,

E <.05.

Inspection of Table 8 reveals that the high ego group tended to show
either

concern

together.

for

others

of

the

use

of

propositions

but

not

both

There was no significant difference in how frequently this

group used the care MO versus the justice MO.

If the CO and PD scales

are accepted as representing the care and justice MOs, then it appears
that contrary to expectations, the high ego group tended to make use of
one MO predominantly while the low ego group did not use either
any significant extent.
of both orientations.

MO to

The two ego groups did not differ in their use
Thus, neither hypothesis was supported.
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Table 8
Analysis of Moral Orientation Usage by Ego Development Level

Orientation Usage
Ego Group.

Both

High

9
Expected

= 8.25

Expected

= 7.75

Low

Note:

One

7

Both
One

Neither

15

26
E

= 17

13
E = 15.99

E

= 24.7

27
E = 23.26

Persons above the mean on care and justice orientation
usage.
= Persons above the mean on either care or justice

orientation usage.
Neither

= Persons not above the mean on either one.
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Power and Intimacy Motivation
There were two hypotheses made regarding motive and moral orientation.

First, it was hypothesized that intimacy motivation would be cor-

related with a care orientation to morality.

Second,

it was proposed

that power motivation would be positively correlated with a justice MO.
To evaluate the relationships between the two motives and the two
MOs, a Pearson correlation analysis was performed.
presented in Table 9.
correlated with PD,

E <.01.
«.

Results indicated that

!(51)

In addition,

ative correlation with

=

intimacy was positively

.245, E <.05, and MR scores,

=

with CS scores,
tions were found.

!(51)

=

.315,

intimacy motivation showed a nonsignificant negEmpathy scores, !(51)

= -.191,

motivation was found to have a significant positive
scores, !(33)

The correlations are

.288,

E <.05,

!(33)

=

E < .09.

Power

association with CO

and a significant: negative correlation

-.305, E <.05.

No other significant correla-
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Table 9
Correlations of Intimacy and Power with Moral Orientation Scores

Intimacy
(!!_ = 53)
Relational Dielmma (RD)

-.128

Power
(!!_ = 35)

.088

Principled Dilemma (PD)

.245*

.000

Consequences to Self (CS)

.044

-.305*

Concern for Others (CO)

. 004

.288*

Maintenance of Relationship (MR)

.315**

.017

Empathy (E)

*E.
**E.

< .OS
<

.01

-.191

-.064

CHAPTER VI

DISCUSSION

Before discussing the

results of this study,

methodological problems that need to be addressed.

there are several
These problems lie

with the 'dependent measure, the Moral Orientation Questionnaire.
open-ended questions on the MOQ allow maximum freedom

The

for subjects to

respond and provide fewer prompts than an interview format.

However,

they also have the disadvantages of being more difficult to score and
hence

less

reliable.

Only

interrater reliability.
satisfactory

in

terms

one scale,

RD,

was

found to

have a

high

The other category scales were found to be only
of

interrater

reliability

and

percentage

of

interrater agreement.
A second problem with the MOQ is the unknown validity of the scoring categories.

The scales were derived on the basis of theory and data

but their validity has not been assessed.
of the category scales makes
they

are

measuring.

Of

The very

broadness of some

it difficult to specify accurately what

course,

success

or

failure

in

finding

the

expected relationships between the MOQ scales and other, reliable measures can itself be an indication of validity.
The methodological weaknesses of this study make any interpretation of these results highly speculative.

With that caveat in mind, the

following tentative interpretations are made.
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Sex Differences
The first hypothesis stated that_ females would show greater evidence of a care orientation in their moral conflicts than males,
males would

show greater

evidence of

dilemmas than would females.

a

justice

orientation in

and

their

The lack of a significant sex difference

on all but one of the MOQ scales suggests that

this is not the case.

This is further indicated by the finding that the women in this sample
made greater

use of

rules,

dilemmas than did males.
use a

norms,

and principles

to construct

their

This suggests that not only do women sometimes

justice orientation, which is

in keeping with the

findings

of

other research (Lyons, 1983), but that they may make greater use of some
aspects of the justice ethic than do men.
Males and females in this sample did not differ in their use of a
desire to maintain a relationship as a reason for moral action, nor in
their use of an empathic reaction as a moral consideration.
of sex

differences

in empathy is

in contradiction to the

Gibbs, Arnold, and Burkhart (1984) and
et al.

Hoffman (1977).

This lack
results of

However, Gibbs

found this difference only for people who scored at Kohlberg's

Stage 3 level of moral development.

The subjects in the present study

were not divided into moral development
differences

in empathy

levels

and therefore any sex

in this sample may have been obscured.

The

definition of empathy employed in this study was not the same as that
adopted by Hoffman.

Hoffman (1979, p. 713) defines empathy as a

II

•
vicar-

ious affective response to another" and distinguishes it from a cognitive awareness of another's

feelings.

Since in this study,

cognitive

53
understanding
results

was

are not

not

differentiated

from

comparable to Hoffman's

affective

research.

response,

its

Future studies of

empathy and morality would do well to take this distinction into account
as Hoffman's definition of empathy appears logically related to the care
MO

and

the conception

of

cognitive

perspective-taking to

a

justice

orientation.
Women did take moral action out of consideration for the welfare
of others more frequently than did men.
ficant,

provides partial support

This trend, although nonsigni-

for the original hypotheses.

If one

considers this in connection with the finding that women in this sample
.:;also make greater use of principles

and norms than did men,

other, alternative interpretations emerge.
to some sex-specific

however,

One possibility is that due

deveJ opmental shift during this

age range women

make greater use of both orientations than do men at this age range.
Another, perhaps more plausible interpretation is derived from Broughton
(1983).

Broughton argues that despite Gilligan's assertion that women

construe moral situations in concrete, contextual and relativistic ways,
in actuality she

accords the virtues of care and responsibility the

status of absolute,

prescriptive, and universal principles.

As such,

her conception of a care orientation to morality resembles the justiceoriented morality of Kohlberg.

This study did not divide subjects into

hierarchical stages of development within the justice and care orientations and therefore does not address the issue of increased abstraction
and universality at higher stages of moral development.

The results do

suggest, however, that women may use prescriptive norms and principles
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to express a care ethic, and point to the need for further research to
clarify

the

issue of

contextualism versus

universality and

to

more

fully distinguish a care from a justice orientation.

Ego Development
This

study

revealed an

association between

ego development

moral orientation but not in the predicted direction.

and

Individuals who

scored at higher ego stages did not use both orientations together more
frequently than did those who scored at

lower ego stages.

People at

higher ego stages did, however, show greater use of a single orientation
in their descriptions of moral dilemmas than did people at
stages.

lower ego

A significant number of individuals at lower ego stages failed

to evidence any distinct moral orientation in their moral conflicts.
The meaning of these findings is unclear. They support Loevinger's
(1976)

assertion that

there

is greater differentiation

stages but do not support the prediction
these.stages.

It appears that

at higher ego

of greater integration at

individuals at high ego stages tend to

recognize and use elements of one or both MOs while people at low ego
stages tend 'to approach moral conflicts in a diffuse and vague manner.
This may be a function of differentiation, so that there is failure to
recognize distinct orientations

at lower ego development

levels.

One

mark of ego maturity can be the degree to which an individual has basic
life commitments, including ethical commitments
be that people at high ego development

(Bourne,

1978).

It may

levels not only recognize dis-

tinct aspects of a moral orientation but also commit themselves to their
use.

As Emmerich and Goldman

(1983)

point out;

moral commitment is
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essential to moral

behavior.

This commitment may be due to the greater

internalization that takes place at higher ego levels or to the achievement of a stable, coherent,
informative to assess

the

ego identity (Bourne, 1978).
relationship

It would be

between moral development or

moral orientation and ego maturity level as assessed by other ego developmental measures such as Marcia's Identity Status Interview (1966) to
see what role commitment, and commitment to certain values plays in morality.
The problem of possible sex bias in this sample (e.g., the greater
number of females in the high ego group) makes the above interpretations
i·~

.of the results concerning ego development and moral orientation uncer';

tain.

It

is

unknown how this

bias may have

affected the results.

Future investigations of ego development and morality should investigate
the effect of sex, perhaps by having
females at each ego stage level.

equivalent numbers of males and

This would help clarify the role of

sex (if any) in the relationship between moral and ego development.
Intimacy and Power Motivation
Support for a connection between intimacy motivation and the care
MO was found in only one category.

Intimacy motivation was positively

associated with the maintenance and preservation of a relationship as a
reason for making a particular moral decision.
a

conception

of

intimacy as

This is consistent with

involving a preference

for

connection.

However, the expected association between intimacy motivation and a concern for others' well-being was not found.

This result conflicts with

those of a study by McAdams, Healy, and Krause (1984) which found inti-
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macy motivation to be associated with an emphasis on trust and concern
for the well-being of others as reasons for friendship.
There is a posiible explanation for this contradiction.

It may be

that concern for others is most frequently seen in personally meaningful
relationships.
in dyadic

Intimacy motive has been linked to a tendency to engage

relationships

(Mcadams,

Healy & Krause,

1984)

and in

this

study it was expected that intimacy motivation would be associated with
moral conflicts in which the dilemma involved a problem in significant
relationships.
although

This was not found and,

nonsignificant

·relational

dilemmas.

correlation
Instead,

in fact,

between

there was

intimacy

a negative

motivation

intimacy motivation was

connected

and
to

conflicts involving the rules, principles and norms characteristic of a
justice ethic.

Perhaps

intimacy motivation is

associated with a ten-

dency not to see conflicts in significant interpersonal relationships as
moral problems,

or perhaps there are

fewer conflicts

ships of people high in intimacy motivation.
high intimacy motivation is

in the relation-

Research has shown that

related to more positive affect and per-

ceived harmony in relationships (McAdams

&

Constantian,

1983) and this

may partly account for the negative correlation between intimacy motivation and relational dilemmas found in this study.
The kind of experience
also

have

affected the

that subjects were asked to describe may

results.

McAdams

(19 82)

found

that

intimacy

motivation was associated with intimacy themes in subects' memories of
peak experiences, satisfying experiences and great learning experiences,
but

not

with memories

•

of

neutral

or unpleasant

experiences .

Also,
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intimacy motivation
approach

in

is

conceived

relationships;

one

of

as

that

is

doing, and research supports this

corresponding
marked

by

to

being

(McAdams, Healy & Krause,

a

communal

rather
1984).

than
In

this study subjects were asked to describe relatively unpleasant (i.e.,
conflictual) experiences that involved some action on their part.

The

elements of action and unpleasantness may partially explain the failure
to find the expected relationship between intimacy motive and certain
aspects of the care orientation.
The proposed connection between power motivation and the justice
orientation was not substantiated.
~;with

the use of rules,

one's own welfare.

Power motivation was not associated

principles and standards, nor with concern for

Thus, the elements of self-protection and objectiv-

ity thought to be linked with power motive were not expressed in this
samples' moral conflicts.

Further, power motivation was found to have a

significant positive correlation with concern for other's welfare as a
basis for moral action.

This finding contradicts the original hypothe-

sis but is in keeping with the agentic ways that power motivation can be
manifested

~n

relationships

e.g., taking charge of a situation, assum-

ing resgonsibility, and helping another.

As McAdams

helping is an active assertion of the self.

(1985) points out,

It may be that power moti-

vation is frequently manifested in giving and helping behaviors whenever
socialization experiences have fostered the development of a caring orientation toward weaker others (McClelland, 1975).
for this possibility.

McAdams

(1984a) found that

There is some support
individuals high in

power motivation described the high points of their friendships as those
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times when one friend offered to help the other.

To better understand

the relationship between power motivation and helping, it would be helpful to know the reasons behind high power individuals' desires to help
others.

Perhaps such a desire is due to a preference for feeling strong

and having an impact on others.

Or perhaps it is a specific kind of

concern for others, a concern that is limited to those who are perceived
as being in a hierarchical relationship with the helper e.g., weaker,
less able.

It would be interesting to discover the differences between

the concern for others evidenced by people high in power motivation as
compared to those high in intimacy motivation, and the differences in
·the kinds of helping behaviors they might exhibit.

This might also

help clarify how concern for others might be expressed differently in
the care and justice MOs.
In summary, there was no evidence to support the hypotheses concerning power motivation and the care and justice ethics and only meager
support for the hypothesis that intimicy motivation would be positively
associated with a care MO.

Before completing this discussion of the

results concerning intimacy and power motivation and their relationships
to the care and justice MOs, it is necessary to point out another limitation of the present study.

The power and intimacy motive scores used

in the analysis were those of separate individuals and therefore it was
impossible to compare the combined effects of the two motives.

Future

research should attempt to look at high and low levels of both motives
in combination to see how they are related to moral reasoning and behavior.
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Concluding Comments
The major hypotheses of this stu.dy concerning the separate relationships between moral orientation and gender, ego development stage,
and intimacy and power motivation were,
ported.

for the most part,

not sup-

However, due to the questionable reliability and unknown valid-

ity of the dependent measures this study may not have been an adequate
test of the relationships between these factors and moral orientation.
To make such a test, a standardized, reliable and valid measure of the
care orientation needs to be devised.
step in this direction.

Lyons (1983) has taken the first

She has developed a scoring system and semi-

.- structured interview method that, she proposes, assesses moral orienta-

,.~:;

tion

and perceptions of self and self-other relationships.

This meas-

ure should be tested for reliability and validity and made available to
other researchers to make further tests.

At the present time there is

little empirical evidence to support Gilligan's thesis that a care orientation exists, and the availability of a standardized measure of the
care MO would help answer this question.

Given a standardized assess-

ment instrument, researchers might investigate the relationships between
a care orientation and affective responses, empathy, helping and other
behaviors, social desirability,

prosocial moral

reasoning

(Eisenberg-

Berg, 1979), interpersonal moral reasoning (Haan, 1978), as well as the
factors examined in this study, in order to delineate more clearly what
a care orientation is.
a measure

It would also be important to determine how such

relates to Kohlberg' s system of assessment.

Longitudinal

studies would also be necessary to determine whether or not the stage
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sequence described by Gilligan is actually exhibited in subjects' lives.
Gilligan's claim of sex differences also requires closer examination, as her claim lacks any strong support.

It will be necessary to

assess the relative importance of biological, psychological and sociocultural factors in moral understanding and behavior.

As Reimer (1983)

notes, "the values and qualities associated with women are not psychologically

predetermined and

inevitable

but

also

related

to

complex

social and cultural factors'' (p. 5). Many have emphasized the important
influence that the societal and cultural environment has on an individual' s development

(Brabeck, 1983;

Miller, 1976).

It may be that

the

socio-cultural context of peoples' development is a more critical factor
in their moral orientation than is biological sex.

One way to investi-

gate this would be to assess the moral orientations exhibited by males
and females from different age cohorts and cultures.
The

larger

and

most

fundamental

question

that

needs

to

be

addressed by research concerns the relationship between Gilligan's conception of a care ethic and the justice- and reason- oriented
embodied in Kohl berg's system.
the care orientation as
stages

of development)

Gilligan originally seemed to propose

something distinct
from the

morality

justice MO.

(at least
This

in the
is

initial

questionable.

Rather than discovering a new kind of morality, Gilligan's greatest contribution seems to have been to broaden our conception of moral development and what is true about morality (Brabeck, 1983;

Kohlberg, 1982).

The care and justice ethics both speak to fundamental but in some
ways opposing aspects of human life.

Kohlberg's model reflects ration-
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ality,

justice, universality, the primacy of the individual, the need

for independence and autonomy.

Gilligan's theory adds to and comple-

ments Kohlberg's system by bringing in affect, care, context, relationships,

and the

needs

for

interdependence

and

connection.

Kohl berg

focuses on what one "should" do as being universally morally right, and
Gilligan focuses

on what one "would" do in a specific moral context

(Kohlberg, 1982).

But these do not appear to be two different kinds of

morality but rather different aspects of one larger morality that integrates reason with affect, autonomy with connection, content with structure, and judgment with action.

The task that now lies before theoreti-

cians and researchers is to integrate Kohlberg's and Gilligan's theories
into a single conception of morality (Brabeck, 1983) and, just as it is
the developmental task of every individual, to unite care with justice.
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MORAL ORIENTATION QUESTIONNAIRE

This is a questionnaire about morality.

Its purpose is to dis-

cover the kinds of moral conflicts that people experience in their lives
and how they deal with and think about those conflicts.

On the follow-

ing pages please describe 4 of the most significant moral conflicts that
you have faced in your life, at least 2 of which have occurred within
the last two years.

By moral conflicts we mean situations in which you

faced a dilemma concerning right and wrong, good and bad.
describe real situations that you have experienced.

Be sure to

Describe each situ-

ation in detail (one per page), answering the following questions:

When and where did the conflict take place?
What events led up to the conflict?

What caused it?

Who , if anybody, was responsible for the conflict having occurred?
If there were other people involved, who were they and what was
their relationship to you?
Why did the situation represent a moral conflict to you?
How did you deal with the conflict?
Why did you deal with it in that way?
What kinds of things were important in making your decision?
What was the outcome of the dilemma?
How do you feel about the outcome?

Remember, describe each situation as it

really happened,

not as

you

68
think i t should have happened.

We are interested in experiences and

there are no right or wrong experiences.
self or others in your accounts.
tial.

Please do not identify your-

All responses will remain confiden-
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I.

Give each dilemma a score in both categories.

Relational Dilemma. (RD).
2--

The dilennna involves at least one of the following (A or B):
A).
B).

1--

a significant personal relationship
e.g., family member, lover, good friend, boy/girl friend,
mentor
the subject clearly expresses concern about harming or
hurting the there; or, responsibility to care for or in
some way give to the other

Neither A nor B

Principled Dilemma. (PD).
2--

The subject states or strongly implies an abstract principle, law,
social or institutional norm that tells how one should or ought
to act. It is a standard for behavior. The subject may imply
amoral proposition by using words such as "believe," "taught,"
"right," and "wrong"
Examples for scoring PD

=2

It is wrong to
(cheat, steal, 'do that', etc.)
People shouldn't steal, cheat, etc.,
=-=---wouldn't be right, fair, just, etc.,
I've always believed that
My parents always told me
I was taught that
I've been brought up to
I've never agreed with
. (premarital sex, stealing, etc.)
One should help others.
Children should obey their parents.
Life is more important than liberty or happiness.
Honesty is the best policy.
When one makes an agreement, one sticks with it.
is a sin.
is against the Church.
-...,-It's against my principles, beliefs, etc.
I've always been against
(stealing, hurting people, drugs)
I didn't think it was right to

---

---

---

---

1~

No moral proposition is put forth or implied.
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CONSIDERATIONS
II.

Score any of the following types of considerations that the
subject uses to make his/her decision. Considerations are what
the subject states are his reasons for deciding to act in a
certain way. The subject may use more than one category of
considerations. Score each category that applies. If the
subject does not use any of the categories listed, than do not
score anything.
Categories and Examples

Consequences to the Subject. (CS).
The subject decides on an act in order to experience positive and/or
avoid negative consequences. i.e., in order to gain something or to
avoid losing something. The focus is on how the subject would be
affected.
Types of consequences include:
Affective:

pleasant or unpleasant feelings. Moral emotions such as
guilt, shame, pride in oneself, etc. are not included
in this category.

Material:

loss or gain of money, material goods, social position, etc.

Physical:

health concerns, physical danger

Others'
Reactions:

gain or loss of others' approval or acceptarice; to avoid
negative emotional reaction in the other because the
emotion will be turned against the subject. e.g., fear
that if the other is made angry he will retaliate against
the subject.

Other examples
Affective
for:
fun, excitement
enjoyment
a thrill
good times
the "experience"
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to avoid:
boredom
sadness
doing something hateful or distasteful
feeling stupid
embarassmen t
because of fear (not specified)
Material
consequences that concern loss or gain of:
money
goods
possessions
status
power convenience e.g., It would be difficult, hard, inconvenient •••
reward
school grades
compensations for subject's effort
a job
influence
to avoid "getting in trouble"
Physical
phrases such as:
would be bad for them
would make them sick
it's unhealthy
good for their body
might get them pregnant
would be physically dangerous
unsafe
might get hurt
not good for them
an indication that they've seen the ill effects of some action on others
e.g., what drinking has done for their friends
Others' Reactions
to gain (or avoid losing) others'
approval
acceptance
affection
trust
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respect
liking
to avoid:
being laughed at
rejection
being disappointed by someone
being blamed, chastised, punished, retaliated against
making the other angry, mad, upset, hostile (not because of concern
for how the other is affected by the emotion but because of how
the subject will be affected)
fear of what the other would 'think' of them
other phrases indicating CS:
I wouldn't want to end up that way
Concern for Others. (CO),
The subject decides on the basis of the consequences to anothE<r person
or group of people.
r!';,

so as not to violate others' rights or to promote
their rights. Matters of justice or~airness to
the other.
Others' affective states: The subject focuses on the impact of the
other persons' feelings on that person. This
is a selfless concern in that the subject is not
worried about how the other person will react
toward the subject. e.g., He/she/they/would feel
angry, hurt, upset, bad, or happy, good
(physical, emotional, material)
Others' needs:
The other needs or lacks something and/or could
potentially benefit from the subjects' actions.
Others' rights;

~~~~~~~~~~~~-

Rights
It would be unfair or unjust to them
They don't deserve that
It would be taking advantage of them
Affect
It would make them feel better
I don't want to hurt, upset them
She wouldn't be happy
to restore harmony in the group
to help everyone get along
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Needs
they can't take care of themselves
they need money, a favor
they need blood, a transplant
he'd be in danger
she needs my help
I don't want to see them get in trouble (ruin their life)
General
because I care about them
Maintenance of Relationship. (MR).
The subject focuses on the relationship itself, and not on any single
person involved. e.g., the friendship, marriage, love relationship,
etc.
The subject acts in order to:
avoid loss of the relationship or
1.
minimize conflict for the sake of the relationship or
2.
strengthen the relationship
3.
Examples
We will be better friends
we are so close
I don't want to lose him/her
the time we share together is so important
because we are friends
Empathy. (E).
The subject clearly expresses empathy for the other person. They show
that they understand and/or sympathize (empathize) with the other's
situation and feelings.
Examples
I knew (understood) how he felt
I put myself in her place
I could see their position
I'd feel pretty bad/good if •..• (whatever happened to the other)
I could imagine what it was like
I knew it must be terrible
If I was in his place I'd ...•
I sympathized with them
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